Myanmar Civil War Overview

On the morning of Feb. 1^st 2021 a spokesman for the National League for Democracy (NLD), Myanmar’s ruling party, made a startling announcement. Party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other senior figures had been arrested and detained following pre-dawn raids in the capitol city of Naypyitaw. This news came a day before the country’s new parliament was set to be sworn in and even in those early hours there was little confusion as to what was occurring. Following 2020 elections the NLD were preparing to take a massive 396 out of 476 seats in parliament. Their opponent was the Union Solidarity and Development party, which exists as the political wing of Myanmar’s military: the Tatmadaw, which had ruled the country until just ten years previous.

Soon the Tatmadaw had announced a state of emergency, declared the result of the 2020 election null and void, and established a new executive governing body: the State Administration Council. Protests broke out and were put down in brutal fashion with over 2,000 killed. By April, the NLD had formed a National Unity Government and asked foreign powers to recognize them as the legitimate government of Myanmar. On May 23 the NUG’s armed wing first clashed with Tatmadaw forces. Full scale civil war was right around the corner.

But the conflict was further complicated by Myanmar’s history and multi-ethnic makeup. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1948, insurrections have simmered in many parts of the country. In that time the military dictatorship has faced challenges from numerous ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) fighting for autonomy or complete independence. Many of these tensions had calmed in the brief democratic period, but after the February coup ceasefire quickly fell apart leading to a labyrinthine array of forces at work in the country.  

The main players

The Tatmadaw

The military, and current ruling junta, of Myanmar that includes army, navy, and air force as well as auxiliary groups including police, border guard, and coast guard. Myanmar has a long history of military dictatorship under the Tatmadaw that ended in 2011 with a move to democratic elections. Even this however was tempered by a Tatmadaw-authored constitution which guaranteed their proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), 25% of parliament. Additionally, this constitution allowed the Tatmadaw to operate as a de facto state-within-a-state, maintaining autonomy and answering not to the civilian president of Myanmar but to a Commander In Chief of Defense Services.

Politically the Tatmadaw embraces right wing Buddhist nationalism and military authoritarianism. They have been accused of numerous human rights violations including the genocide of Rohingya Muslims beginning in 2017.

Following the coup, acting President Myint Swe proclaimed a year-long state of emergency and declared power had been transferred to Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who then created the SAC as Myanmar’s interim ruling body. Min Aung Hlaing currently chairs the SAC committee and serves as Prime Minister. The SAC declared the results of the 2020 election invalid and stated its intent to hold a new election as soon as the state of emergency had been concluded. This goal continues to be delayed however and in 2023 the SAC passed an electoral law aimed at solidifying military’s rule in future elections. 

As a result of the ongoing civil war the Tatmadaw and SAC control far less of Myanmar than the previous government, with 132 of Myanmar’s 330 townships outside their control. In February, 2024 an order for widespread conscription was announced.  

National Unity Government (NUG)

The Government in exile that is currently opposing the Tatmadaw and SAC. Formed in response to the 2021 coup by members of the NLD party elected in the overturned 2020 election, as well as smaller ethnic minority organizations (ethnic minorities in fact hold several senior positions in the NUG). They have been recognized as the legitimate government of Myanmar by the EU Parliament. Win Myint is officially president of the NUG, though due to his incarceration Vice President Duwa Lashi La is currently acting President. Unlike most governments in exile, the NUG operates within their own country (in areas outside SAC control) rather than from a foreign nation. 

The NLD, which makes up the majority of the NUG, is a liberal, pro-democracy party. It alleges to stand for human rights though Aung San Suu Kyi has been criticized for her silence and defense of the military during the Rohingya Genocide. 

In May of 2021 the NUG formed an armed wing to combat the Tatmadaw: the People's Defense Force. Current estimates put its numbers around 100,000 recruits though many are believed to still be in training. This is believed to include 16,000 defectors from the Tatamadaw and Myanmar police force.

Allies of the National Unity Government

Three Brotherhood Alliance 

An alliance of three ideologically disparate, but geographically close groups. The Ta'ang National Liberation Army and Arakan Army are EAOs dedicated to the sovereignty of their respective ethnic groups. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army meanwhile is an offshoot that split from the Burma Communist Party in 1989 and signed a treaty with the Myanmar government under which they were given rights to tax the population of the Kokang region. They are alleged to be involved in the area’s drug trade.

The alliance has made significant inroads in the Shah state, including the ongoing Operation 1027: an offensive in which anti-SAC forces seized over 40 towns and numerous strategic positions. Much of the captured territory is close to the Chinese border, resulting in significant interruption of junta trade with China, 70% of which flows through Shah state. This is estimated to be costing the junta over $400k a day in tax revenue.

Kachin Independence Army (KIA)

The armed wing of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The Kachin are a collation of tribes spread between China, Northeast India and Kachin State in Myanmar and the KIO and KIA aim to create an autonomous homeland for them. Aside from a brief flirtation with communism the late 60s, these organizations are ideologically focused on Kachin Nationalism.

Following a peace treaty with the government of Myanmar in 1994, conflict largely stopped though the KIA was not forced to disarm and instead continued to recruit. Following the coup, the KIA seized a strategic base in Alaw Bum near the Chinese border, marking renewed fighting. Since then several more Tatmadaw bases have fallen to the KIA.

4K Coalition  

Alliance founded in 2023 operating in eastern Myanmar along the Thai border comprised of four separate armed ethnic organizations of Karen and Karenni peoples. Ideologies among the allies differ: the Karen National Liberation Army and Karreni Army are focused solely on self-determination for their respective ethnic groups while the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front is explicitly communist. The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force formed after the coup for the specific purpose of fighting the junta. 

Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA)

An EAO made up of the Pa-O ethnic group: the second largest ethnic group in Myanmar’s Shan state, with a population of 1.2 million. The PNLA split with the Pa-O National Organization (PNO) in January 2024 when the latter’s collaboration with the SAC. They backed out of the quickly collapsing Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and pledged to help the NUG replace the Junta with a democratic system. 

People's Liberation Army (PLA)

The PLA traces its origins to the communist party of Burma founded in 1939. Following decades of unsuccessful guerilla insurgency in Myanmar many CPB party members, including senior leaders, were forced into exile across the Chinese border. In 2021 following the coup, the CPB announced that it had formed a new armed wing, the PLA and reentered Myanmar to fight the junta. This new fighting force was initially armed by the KIA and have fought alongside the Peoples Defense Force.

Allies of the State Administration Council

Pa-O National Army (PNO)

As part of the 2008 constitution, a Pa’O Self Administered Zone in the Shah state was created. The Pa-O National Organization governs this area and their armed wing, the Pa-O National Army (PNA) is in charge of its defense. As the coup has not changed this situation, the PNA and PNO maintain close ties with the SAC and continue to assist the Tatmadaw in military operations.

Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) 

A nationalist militia group representing the Zo people, who occupy northeastern India as well as Myanmar’s Chin state. The ZRA operates in these areas, with the Myanmar wing known as the Eastern Command. They have historically clashed with Chin ethnic militias and prior to the coup fought them alongside government forces. After the 2021 coup the ZRA claimed that it would not support the junta. However, they soon began cooperating with Tatmadaw in clashes with resistance-aligned Chin forces. Since 2021, opiate production in Chin state has surged, specifically in ZRA-controlled areas.

New Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K)

The NDA-K was founded in 1989 by former KIA officers, who splintered from that group due to the former’s communist leanings. In the same year, the group agreed to a ceasefire with the government, and it has operated under the Tatmadaw's command as a "special regional task force" ever since.

Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA)

An ethnic insurgent group made up of Shanni people in Kachin state. Historically they have been in conflict with the KIA over alleged oppression of Shanni people. Since 2022 the SNA has worked with the Tatmadaw against their old rivals the KIA, now supporters of the NUG.

Unaligned

United Wa State Army (UWSA)

In 1989, at the end of a 40 year communist insurgency, a group of ethnic Wa soldiers split from the disintegrating Communist Party to form the UWSA. They are now the military wing of the United Wa State Party, de facto rulers of the Wa state comprised of Wa people. Though the Wa state operates autonomously, but recognizes the Myanmar government’s sovereignty and does not seek full independence. This has lead to a situation in which the Wa state remains neutral throughout the conflict, as the new order does not threaten their autonomy, and has promised to use force against invasions from either side. Interestingly though they are believed to have provided Wa State-produced weaponry to the Three Brotherhood Alliance in their 1027 operation.

Karen National Army (KNA)

In 1994 a group of Buddhist soldiers in the Karen National Liberation Army broke from the group, claiming that the KNLA was unfairly dominated by Christians. They rebranded themselves as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DBKA) and immediately pursued a ceasefire deal with the Tatmadaw. In 2010 the DKBA officially became a border guard force under the command of the Tatmadaw, now called the Karen Border Guard Forces. 

Shortly before the coup, the military demanded that many high ranking commanders in this border guard, including the influential Saw Chit Thu, resign. This was met with a wave of protest after which the organization announced its split from the military and rebranded once more as the Karen National Army. The KNA has officially declared neutrality in the conflict, though they have been accused of assisting Tatamdaw troops in the area around the city of Myawaddy. Additional accusations have been made that Saw Chit Thu, who was sanctioned by the UK for human trafficking, has become a de facto warlord in the region and is using the KNA to provide protection for illegal scamming, trafficking, gambling and prostitution rings in the region.

Conclusion

Nearly four years into the conflict a resolution seems distant and the future of Myanmar uncertain. The National Unity Government lacks the strength to overthrow the Tatmadaw and conversely the Tatmadaw is faced with such widespread rebellion from armed ethnic groups that it is unable to consolidate power in much of the country. 

Indeed the Tatmadaw’s coup looks in retrospect not only fascistic but foolhardy in the extreme. Armed sectarian conflict in the country has waxed, waned, and shifted over the years but has been ongoing since 1948 when the country gained independence from the UK, leading to its recognition as the world’s longest running civil war. Given Myanmar’s history and the fractured nature of its population, the result of reinstating the undemocratic junta was always going to be a resurgence of these armed struggles. 

What happens next is unclear. The recently-concluded Syrian Civil War lasted 13 years with little movement for much of that period until a sudden push by rebel groups swept the country in a matter of weeks. A similar result in Myanmar might be possible were neighboring China to place its thumb on the scale for either side, but Beijing has so far been wary of any sizable involvement. Perhaps then we are witnessing the balkanization of Myanmar, and its future is split into numerous autonomous regions.

One fact that has become increasingly clear in the aftermath of the junta’s follies (both recent and dating back to the country’s founding) is the necessity of democratic representation in holding together a pluralistic state. Absent the involvement of all minority groups in the affairs of a nation we see the natural human inclination towards self-determination repressed. Such energy does not disappear, as dictators and fascists might wish, but instead redirects itself into new channels; many of them destabilizing to a nation.

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Featured image is Mon State Kyomaro Township bombed