Liberalism's Persistent Troubles: James E. Cronin's "Fragile Victory"

In Fragile Victory: The Making and Unmaking of Liberal Order (Yale University Press, 2023), the historian James E. Cronin attempts to pinpoint the moment in time when liberalism’s international troubles began. While the dual shock of Brexit and Trump sent a clear signal to world leaders that liberalism had entered a veritable period of crisis, Cronin points out that the international system was already fraying in the second half of the twentieth century. 

Fashioned together during the closing phase of the Second World War, by the 1970s the so-called ‘liberal international order’ was showing signs of fragility. The oil crisis in the Middle East had caused rising inflation and a stagnation of wages (the combo of ‘stagflation’), officially bringing an exceptional period of American prosperity to an abrupt end. Politicians were initially incapable of stabilizing the economy and diplomats were powerless to turn world events in their favor. For the first time since the post-war boom, ordinary Americans felt genuinely victimized by global forces beyond their control. 

The politicians that came into office to fix this economic mess were able to tame inflation, but were never able to recover the remarkable rates of growth that marked the post-war boom. The American manufacturing sector would continue to decline, and with it, the economic vitality of once-affluent cities such as Detroit and Pittsburgh. Ever greater poverty, displacement, and wealth inequality would set in. As the rich world developed an acute awareness of the fickleness of the global economic system, and demanded greater protections from their government, market-friendly politicians (now referred to as ‘neoliberals’) distanced themselves from big government spending on welfare. They called on voters to embrace globalization and worked hard to further tie their economies to the emerging world market. 

The Clinton administration played an instrumental role in the normalization of market fundamentalism. While noticeably hesitant to engage in global conflicts, the Clinton administration was more than willing to pursue trade relations if these offered the promise of greater economic opportunities for American businesses and workers. The administration’s policy makers were convinced that the United States needed to remain active in the international realm to ‘‘open foreign markets and create jobs for our people.’’ For Cronin, the connection between foreign policy and the search for new markets ‘‘could be understood as a sign of America’s long-term commitment to a capitalist future.’’ As the next three decades would confirm, America’s ‘neoliberal turn’ would set the country on a dangerous financial trajectory. 

The combined effects of the ‘China shock’ (the flooding of the global market with cheap Chinese goods and the reshoring of decent jobs) and the ‘Great Recession’ embittered many. On both sides of the political spectrum, people began to draw a straight line from the economic hardship of the 2000s to the market-friendly policies of the political elite. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent wars in the Middle East further entrenched this popular feeling of disillusionment. 

The realization that both foreign and domestic policies were partly driven by the designs of corporate lobbyists, rather than the will of ordinary American people, produced two distinct political responses. On the right, voters began to turn against those who seemed to put the interests of foreigners above the well-being of hard-working Americans. The uptick in xenophobia against Muslims and Latin Americans was partly tied to the idea that by fighting for democracy abroad and normalizing the immigration status of undocumented workers at home, politicians were failing to put ‘America first’. On the left, the bailout of financial institutions and the continued pursuit of costly and seemingly unending ‘forever wars’ conveyed to progressive voters that establishment Democrats were fundamentally disinterested in the pursuit of justice. 

As the center of American politics atrophied, and voters veered to extremes, more disruptive political actors were able to capture mainstream positions. The rise of populist politicians dedicated to a radical transformation of the political system was in part a reflection of the inability of the center to convince voters that liberalism was working. Cronin notes that the recession and its aftereffects had effectively robbed politicians of the most powerful weapon in their arsenal: ‘‘the claim that liberal capitalism was an engine of growth and prosperity.’’ Without the seductive power of a booming economy, liberalism’s flaws were exposed for all to see. 

It is in fact a testament to the merits of the liberal system that it was able to function for so long while obscuring the considerable difficulties that attended its creation and the even greater challenges that affected its development. As Cronin repeatedly reminds his readers, liberalism's ascendance as the dominant mode of international relations was tenuous from the start. Liberalism became the ruling ideology of the twentieth century when the Soviet Union collapsed under its own mismanagement. The enduring prosperity of liberal societies, especially when contrasted with the dysfunction on display in socialist countries at the end of the Cold War, was undoubtedly a vindication of the economic soundness of capitalism. That said, the mere removal of a rival was simply too fragile a victory to withstand the strain of time. With the mirage of economic prosperity out of the way, it became much easier for a larger share of the voting public to question the logic of markets, and to seek out populist politicians who were willing to disrupt the political status-quo. 

In the end, liberalism’s current troubles speak first and foremost to its inherent fragility. As Cronin observes, well-meaning efforts to build a new world order based on liberal values were ‘‘routinely hard, the results impermanent and hardly normative, even when they seemed to be stable and enduring’’. As noted earlier, the birth of a liberal order was also made possible by unique historical conditions. These ideal conditions are simply irreplicable today. As such the best way forward is to seriously contend with the failings of the past in order to meet the challenges of the present. This might mean more modest, realistic goals, starting with sober attempts to fix the policy problems that drive voters away from the political mainstream. 

While liberalism remains a fragile accomplishment, this fragility need not be seen as lethal. With the right ideas and policy tweaking, liberal nations should be able to at least withstand the latest global wave of democratic discontent. The loss of confidence among working-class white men suggests that liberals cannot afford to ignore industrial policy. Under President Biden some liberals have begun to address this oversight, but more work will need to be done to neutralize the threat of right-wing populism and maintain liberalism’s vitality. Among other things, liberals must be attuned to shifts in the international mood. When challenged by resurgent reactionary forces, liberals must not shy away from devoting themselves to the arduous task of defending the cause of liberty, both at home and abroad.

Featured image is Commemorative plaque Nazi book burning 1933 on ground of Römerberg square in front of Frankfurt city hall, Hesse, Germany, by ArcCan